How the Draft ACOP Missed the Mark on Residential Construction Deliveries

5 days ago
9 min read

A Hiab truck arrives at a residential building site.

The driver has a delivery docket, an address, a product description, and a phone number. The load is timber. The customer wants it on-site. The builder is waiting for it. The merchant has booked the delivery. The truck has already travelled across town.

Then the driver gets to the gate.

Let’s not see this - ACOP for Residential Construction

There is no clear set-down area. The driveway is blocked. The only place to park the truck is partly in the road corridor. The footpath is live. Other trades are working in the landing area. There are signs of recent excavation near where the stabilisers would need to go. Nobody on-site can confirm where the underground services are. The contact number on the job is for the person who ordered the timber, not the person who controls the site.

The builder says, “It will be fine.”

The driver knows it is not fine.

This is the daily problem for Hiab operators delivering to residential construction sites. It is also where WorkSafe’s draft ACOP on residential construction roles and responsibilities falls short.

Deliveries are not just transport tasks

A residential construction delivery is often treated as a simple supply activity.

Someone orders materials. Someone delivers them.

But a Hiab delivery is not just a courier drop-off. It can involve:

a heavy vehicle;
a truck-mounted crane;
stabilisers and ground loading;
suspended loads;
public roads, berms, footpaths, and driveways;
pedestrians, cyclists, neighbours, and school traffic;
overhead lines;
underground services;
recent excavations;
other trades working at the same time;
restricted site access;
pressure to keep the job moving.

That is a construction site risk. It is not created only by the Hiab company. It is created by the way the site is planned, controlled, and coordinated before the truck arrives.

The draft ACOP recognises the issue, but does not complete the solution

The draft ACOP correctly says it is for people involved in residential construction, including supply chain partners such as hardware and material suppliers and transport operators. It also makes clear that PCBUs must consult, cooperate, and coordinate where they have overlapping duties.

That is a useful starting point.

The problem is that the draft then focuses its practical role guidance on clients, principal contractors, contractors, subcontractors, workers, homeowners, other persons, and officers. The merchant-arranged delivery chain is not clearly addressed.

That is a serious gap.

In the real world, the merchant is often the link between the builder and the Hiab company. The merchant receives the order, arranges the delivery, passes on the address, and provides the phone number. But the merchant is not a Hiab company. It may not know what information a Hiab operator needs to decide whether the site is ready.

The Hiab company may not know what is missing until the driver arrives.

By then, the cost has already been incurred.

Example 3 is helpful because it shows what good looks like

Example 3 in the draft ACOP is one of the most useful parts of the document.

In that example, the principal contractor identifies overhead powerlines across the site entrance during early planning. He contacts the local electricity lines authority, confirms Minimum Approach Distances, agrees on access and delivery procedures with other trades, updates the site plan, marks safe access routes, creates a set-down area, establishes exclusion zones, and shares that information with trades expecting deliveries. Those trades then pass the information to their delivery companies so drivers know what to do when they arrive.

That example is valuable because it shows the right principle:

The delivery is planned before the truck arrives.

The driver does not have to discover the problem at the gate. The site controller has identified the hazard, obtained advice, agreed on the delivery method, updated the site plan, and communicated the controls through the delivery chain.

That is exactly the kind of thinking residential construction needs.

But the ACOP could go further.

The real problem is not just overhead lines

Example 3 focuses on overhead powerlines. That is a clear and serious risk.

But Hiab operators face a much broader delivery problem every day.

The same planning approach should apply to:

traffic management;
road corridor use;
public interfaces;
footpaths and berms;
underground services;
recent excavations;
soft or backfilled ground;
shared driveways;
simultaneous operations;
exclusion zones;
set-down areas;
site access and egress.

These are not unusual events. They are routine issues in residential construction delivery.

A truck that cannot safely access the site may need to stand in the road. A footpath may need to be closed or controlled. A delivery may need a spotter, traffic management, pedestrian control, or an agreed delivery window. A set-down area may need to be cleared before the truck arrives. Other trades may need to be moved out of the lift zone.

Those controls cannot be reliably created by a single driver under pressure at the roadside.

The road corridor example shows why the ACOP needs to be clearer

This issue is seen every day.

A Hiab truck sets up in the roading corridor because there is no practical space on site. The road controlling authority sees the truck and blames the Hiab company.

That is understandable at a surface level. The truck is visible. The driver is present. The crane is operating.

But the visible party is not always the party that created the problem.

The builder knew the delivery was on the way. The contractor knew the material had been ordered. The principal contractor or site controller knew whether the site could receive a truck. The person arranging the delivery knew, or should have known, whether the truck would need to use the road, footpath, berm, or shared access.

If traffic management was needed, it should have been arranged before the truck arrived.

If the road corridor was going to be affected, that should have been identified before dispatch.

If there was no safe set-down area, the site was not ready for the delivery.

The ACOP should say this clearly.

The phone number on the job is often not enough

A common failure point is the contact number.

The phone number given to the Hiab company is often the number of the PCBU that purchased the product. That may be the builder, a subcontractor, or another party that wants the material delivered.

But the purchaser is not always the PCBU that controls the site.

The purchaser may not know:

whether the principal contractor has approved the delivery;
whether the road corridor will be affected;
whether traffic management is required;
whether the set-down area is clear;
whether the ground is suitable for stabilisers;
whether recent excavation has changed the site;
whether other trades are working in the unloading area.

When asked, the purchaser may simply say the site is ready because they want the product delivered.

That is not a safe system. It is a weak information chain.

The ACOP should require the delivery contact to be the site controller, or a person authorised by the site controller, where the delivery involves plant, lifting, public interfaces, or road corridor risk.

The commercial pressure is part of the risk

There is also a commercial reality that the ACOP does not address clearly enough.

The Hiab company often only discovers the missing information after the truck has arrived.

By that point, the operator has already incurred:

driver time;
fuel;
vehicle operating cost;
scheduling cost;
lost capacity for other work;
disruption to the delivery programme.

If the delivery cannot proceed, that cost may not be recoverable.

This creates pressure to complete the delivery even when the site was not properly prepared. It also puts the driver in a difficult position. The driver is alone on site, the customer wants the product unloaded, and the company is already bearing the cost of the failed delivery.

A safe system should not rely on a lone driver absorbing the consequences of upstream planning failures.

The ACOP should define site readiness for deliveries

The ACOP should include a dedicated delivery section.

That section should make one point clear:

The PCBU arranging, ordering, or expecting delivery must ensure the site is ready to receive it.

For a Hiab delivery, site readiness should include confirmation of:

Site Readiness Issue	What should be confirmed before dispatch
Site control	Who is the principal contractor or site controller?
Delivery authority	Has the site controller approved the delivery?
Delivery timing	Is the delivery booked for a time that avoids conflict with other work?
Access	Can the truck enter, set up, unload, and exit safely?
Road corridor	Will any part of the truck, crane, load, stabilisers, or exclusion zone affect the road, berm, footpath, or public area?
Traffic management	Are road users, pedestrians, cyclists, neighbours, and school traffic protected?
Set-down area	Is the landing area clear, suitable, and agreed?
Ground conditions	Is the setup area suitable for the vehicle and stabilisers?
Underground services	Are services identified where stabilisers or vehicle loads may be applied?
Recent excavation	Are trenches, backfilled areas, soak holes, or unsupported edges identified?
Other trades	Are workers kept clear of the lift zone, load path, and set-down area?
Escalation	What happens if conditions on arrival do not match the plan?

This is practical information. It does not require complex paperwork for every delivery. It requires the right questions to be answered before the truck leaves the yard.

The merchant should be treated as the delivery information gateway

The merchant should not be expected to design the lift, assess ground bearing capacity, or prepare the traffic management plan.

But if the merchant arranges the delivery, the merchant is a key information gateway.

The ACOP should recognise this.

A merchant arranging a Hiab delivery should collect and pass on delivery-critical information, including:

the site controller’s name and phone number;
confirmation that the site controller has approved the delivery;
the agreed access point;
the agreed setup location;
the agreed set-down area;
whether the road corridor, footpath, berm, or public area will be affected;
whether traffic or pedestrian management is required;
whether there are known overhead or underground services;
whether recent excavations or soft ground affect the setup area;
whether other trades will be clear;
What the driver should do if the site is not ready.

This would not make the merchant responsible for everything. It would make the merchant responsible for passing the right information through the chain.

Builders and contractors must not avoid cost by avoiding planning

The ACOP should also be direct about the role of builders, contractors, and subcontractors who order materials.

If a builder orders timber and knows a Hiab is coming, the builder should not ignore the delivery risk and leave the driver to make it work.

If the site needs traffic management, that needs to be planned.

If the set-down area is blocked, it needs to be cleared.

If the truck will affect the road corridor, that needs to be coordinated.

If other trades are working in the lift zone, they need to be moved or the delivery rescheduled.

Avoiding the planning cost does not remove the risk. It transfers the risk to the driver and the public.

That is what the ACOP should prevent.

The driver should verify the plan, not create it

The Hiab driver has an important role.

The driver should check conditions on arrival. The driver should confirm the setup area, exclusion zone, set-down area, overhead hazards, public interface, and ground conditions. The driver should stop if the site does not match the plan or if the work cannot be completed safely.

But the driver should not be expected to create the entire delivery plan after arrival.

The driver cannot reasonably be expected to solve, alone:

no road corridor approval;
no traffic management;
no pedestrian control;
no competent site contact;
unknown underground services;
recent excavation beside the setup area;
other trades in the landing zone;
pressure from the purchaser to unload anyway.

That is not consultation, cooperation, and coordination. That is failure being discovered too late.

How the ACOP could fix the issue

The ACOP could be improved by adding a delivery-specific section under the principal contractor, contractor, subcontractor, and supply chain partner guidance.

Suggested wording:

Where a PCBU orders, arranges, or expects materials, plant, or equipment to be delivered to a residential construction site, that PCBU should consult, cooperate, and coordinate with the principal contractor or site controller before the delivery is confirmed.

Before dispatch, the delivery company should receive enough information to carry out the delivery safely. This should include the site controller contact, approved access route, setup location, set-down area, road corridor impacts, traffic and pedestrian management requirements, relevant site hazards, other work happening nearby, and the process to follow if the site is not ready.

Where a delivery may affect the road corridor, footpath, berm, shared access, or public area, the principal contractor or site controller should confirm what approvals, traffic management, pedestrian controls, and public protection are required before the delivery arrives.

The delivery driver’s arrival check should verify the agreed plan. It should not be the first time delivery risks are assessed.

That would turn the draft ACOP from general guidance into a practical tool.

Example 3 shows the path forward

Example 3 is helpful because it shows planning happening at the right time and by the right people.

The principal contractor identifies the access hazard. The site plan is updated. The set-down area is agreed. Exclusion zones are created. The information is passed to the delivery companies. Operators arrive knowing what to do.

That is the model.

The next step is to apply that model to all significant delivery risks, not only overhead powerlines.

The ACOP should make clear that residential construction deliveries need a planned receiving environment. The site must be ready. The delivery information must flow from the site controller, through the builder or contractor, through the merchant, and to the Hiab company before the truck is dispatched.

That would help everyone.